PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:
Plaintiff Arthur F. Brown III ("Brown") brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), which denied Brown's application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Both parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Before the Court is the January 10, 2014 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox, recommending that the Court grant Brown's motion, deny the Commissioner's motion, and remand the case to the Commissioner for reconsideration. Dkt. 19 (the "Report").
For the reasons that follow, the Court declines to adopt the Report; instead, the Court denies Brown's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and grants the Commissioner's motion.
Brown was born in 1958 and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science. Between August 2007 and January 2009, he worked as an administrative assistant and the director of operations for a not-for-profit organization. In January 2009, Brown was discharged from his job due to budgetary cuts. Brown would have continued working for the same organization had his position not been eliminated.
On May 13, 2009, Brown filed an application for disability insurance benefits, alleging that he had been disabled since January 6, 2009 — i.e., since his discharge.
On April 6, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision denying Brown's request for disability insurance benefits. Employing the five-step evaluation process set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ found at step one that Brown was not engaged in substantial gainful activity and, at step two, that Brown suffered from two "severe" impairments — namely, osteoarthritis of the knees and obesity. However, the ALJ determined that Brown's mental impairments — i.e., mood disorder, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder — "considered singly and in combination," were non-severe, because they caused only "mild" limitations in daily living, social functioning, concentration, persistence, or pace, and because Brown had experienced no "episodes of decompensation... of extended duration." Admin. Rec. at 15 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1)). At step three, the ALJ found that Brown's two severe impairments did not meet or medically equal the specified criteria of any listed impairment, meaning that a finding of disability was not permitted at that step. The ALJ therefore undertook the assessment at step four, which "focuses on whether, despite a disability claimant's severe impairments, the claimant `possesses the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform her past relevant work.'" Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996)).
At step four, the ALJ determined that Brown, based on "careful consideration of the entire record," possessed the RFC to "perform the full range of light work," Admin. Rec. at 16, and that, in light of his RFC, Brown was capable "of performing past relevant work as [an] administrative assistant and [a] director of operations," id. at 18. In so concluding, the ALJ referenced and applied the relevant regulation, which defined "light work" as:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The ALJ, however, did not explicitly analyze Brown's work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.
On September 20, 2012, Brown commenced this action. See Dkt. 1 ("Complaint"). The Complaint challenged the decision to deny Brown's disability claim on two grounds. First, Brown contends that the ALJ did not follow the "treating physician" rule, because he failed: (1) to give the assessment of Brown's treating physician, Dr. J. Toskes, the "controlling weight" it was due; and (2) to give significant weight to the evidence offered by Mr. Julius Nwosu, a physician's assistant ("PA") who treated Brown. Second, Brown contends that the ALJ failed to provide a detailed analysis of Brown's RFC, in that the ALJ did not expressly assess how long Brown can sit, stand, or walk, or how much he can carry. Brown also asserts that the ALJ wrongly failed to consider Brown's psychiatric impairments when assessing his RFC.
On October 1, 2012, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Fox. Dkt. 2. On February 4, 2013, the Commissioner answered. Dkt. 7. On April 5, 2013, Brown filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 9, and a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 10 ("Pet. Br."). On July 23, 2013, the Commissioner filed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 15, and a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 17 ("Resp. Br.").
On January 10, 2014, Magistrate Judge Fox issued a Report and Recommendation on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. See Report. As to Brown's first challenge, Judge Fox concluded that there was no merit to the claim that Dr. Toskes was Brown's treating physician or that PA Nwosu's opinion was entitled to significant weight. See Report at 17-18. As to Brown's second challenge, however, Judge Fox concluded that the ALJ had "failed to include a function-by-function assessment of Brown's physical and mental capacities in assessing Brown's [RFC]," or a "narrative discussion of Brown's ability to perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis." Id. at 19. Judge Fox held that these omissions by the ALJ made it impossible "to ascertain how the ALJ made his finding, at step four of the sequential analysis, that Brown can perform the full range of light work and that he is capable of performing past relevant work." Id. Accordingly, Judge Fox recommended that the Court grant Brown's motion, deny the Commissioner's cross-motion, and remand this case to the Commissioner for reconsideration of step four of the sequential analysis. Id.
In reviewing a Report and Recommendation, a district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When specific objections are made, "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); United
On February 13, 2014, the Commissioner submitted objections to the Report. Dkt. 22 ("Resp. Obj."). The Commissioner's primary objection is that the Report is inconsistent with the Second Circuit's recent decision in Cichocki, 729 F.3d 172, which was decided after the briefs in this case were submitted.
Id. "Remand may be appropriate, however, where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Id.
Because the Commissioner has raised a specific objection to the Report, the Court reviews the ALJ's decision de novo.
"A claimant is disabled and entitled to disability insurance benefits if she is unable `to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.'" Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 176 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The Social Security Act regulations establish a five-step sequential evaluation process to guide disability determinations:
Perez, 77 F.3d at 46 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003).
Relevant here is step four: "If a claimant has a severe impairment limiting her mental or physical ability to do basic work activities but not constituting a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations, the Commissioner asks, at Step Four, whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to perform her past work." Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 176 (quoting Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An individual's RFC "is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis." Id. (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1). If, at step four, the ALJ determines that a claimant has the RFC to perform his or her past work, then he or she is not disabled and thus is not entitled to disability benefits.
As stated above, the ALJ here determined that Brown has the RFC needed to perform his past work, and thus is not disabled.
A district court may "set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by `substantial evidence' or if the decision is based on legal error." Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); see also Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012) (reviewing courts "conduct a plenary review of the administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole, to support the Commissioner's decision and if the correct legal standards have been applied") (citations omitted). "It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled ... or to answer in the first instance the inquiries posed by the five-step analysis set out in the SSA regulations." Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir.1999) (citations omitted).
Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). The Second Circuit has described substantial evidence review as "a very deferential standard of review — even more so than the `clearly erroneous' standard." Brault, 683 F.3d at 448 (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)). Accordingly, once an ALJ finds facts, this Court may only reject those facts "if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Id.
Based on the Court's detailed review of the administrative record, the Commissioner's decision denying Brown's disability benefits claim must be affirmed.
At the outset, neither side credibly asserts that the ALJ made any error of law in his opinion, and the Court independently finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. Moreover, based on the Court's review, the ALJ's analysis of Brown's functional limitations and restrictions afforded an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, and his conclusion that Brown was not disabled under step four of the sequential test was supported by substantial evidence. Although the ALJ, as Magistrate Judge Fox points out, did not include an explicit function-by-function analysis of Brown's capabilities, he did analyze, in detail, all of Brown's relevant limitations in determining that Brown was capable of performing his past work.
Specifically, in his decision, the ALJ concluded that Brown suffered, during the relevant period, two "severe" physical impairments — osteoarthritis of the knees and obesity. Admin. Rec. at 14. In assessing whether these impairments foreclosed Brown's ability to work, the ALJ relied on the full range of medical evidence in the record. In particular, the ALJ relied upon a consultative examination that was conducted by Dr. Brian Hamway on August 4, 2009. In that examination, Brown was found to have a full range of motion in his shoulders, elbows, forearms, wrists, hips, knees, and ankles. Id. at 17. Brown could walk on his heels and toes without difficulty and could perform a full squat. Id. He could also go on and off the examination table and rise from a seated position without difficulty. Id. His muscle strength was reported as a five out of five (i.e., normal strength), and his lumbar range of motion was normal except for "a ten degree reduction in extension." Id. Moreover, the assessment determined that Brown had only mild limitations in prolonged walking, climbing, squatting, kneeling, lifting, and carrying due to knee and lower back pain. Id. The ALJ also noted that the following facts were consistent with a residual capacity to perform light work: that Brown (1) was able to bike for 15 minutes on three occasions in August 2009; (2) reported being able to perform numerous daily tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, and attending sporting events and musical performances; and (3) was able to climb four flights of stairs to reach his fifth-floor walk-up apartment "without too much difficulty." Id. Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Brown was able to perform the full range of light work, id. at 16 — meaning that, under the relevant regulation, he could perform: (1) occasional lifting of no more than 20 pounds and frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds; and (2) a good deal of walking and standing, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The Court concludes that this determination is both detailed enough to be judicially reviewed, and supported by substantial evidence.
As to the ALJ's determination that Brown's mental impairments were not severe, that, too, is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Although the ALJ concluded that Brown's only "severe" impairments were physical — i.e., osteoarthritis of the knees and obesity — the ALJ still
Because the Commissioner's decision denying Brown disability benefits is supported by substantial evidence, and because that decision included a thorough analysis of the evidence of Brown's physical and mental limitations, the only basis for remanding this case to the Commissioner would be the ALJ's omission of a "function-by-function analysis." In this Circuit, however, "the failure explicitly to engage in such a function-by-function analysis does not constitute a per se error requiring remand." Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 173-74. Finding no other basis for reversal or remand, the Court affirms the Commissioner's
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Brown's motion for judgment on the pleadings and grants the Commissioner's motion. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions pending at docket numbers 9 and 15 and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
729 F.3d at 178 n. 3 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, in this case, the ALJ concluded that Brown's mental impairments did not cause "more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities." Admin. Rec. at 14.
